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Good science requires both reliable methods and rigorous theory. Theory allows us to build a 
unified structure of knowledge, to connect the dots of individual studies and reveal the bigger 
picture. Some have criticized the proliferation of pet “Theories,” but generic “theory” is 
essential to healthy science, because questions of theory are ultimately those of validity. 
Although reliable methods and rigorous theory are synergistic, Action Identification suggests 
psychological tension between them: the more we focus on methodological details, the less 
we notice the broader connections. Therefore, psychology needs to supplement training in 
methods (how to design studies and analyze data) with training in theory (how to connect 
studies and synthesize ideas). This paper provides a technique for visually outlining theory: 
theory mapping. Theory mapping contains five elements, which are illustrated with moral 
judgment and with cars.  Also included are 15 additional theory maps provided by experts in 
emotion, culture, priming, power, stress, ideology, morality, marketing, decision-making, and 
more (see all at theorymaps.org). Theory mapping provides both precision and synthesis, 
which helps to resolve arguments, prevent redundancies, assess the theoretical contribution of 
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How to Map Theory: Reliable Methods Are Fruitless Without 
Rigorous Theory 
 
“The trick to forgetting the big picture is to look at everything close up.”  
--Chuck Palahniuk 
 
What makes for good science?  Test your intuitions by deciding which of these studies 
makes a more important contribution: 
Study 1 involves 123 white, male, middle class university students who 
respond to a few multiple choice questions. Researchers report only 
descriptive statistics, do not preregister their hypotheses, and do not their 
share their data.  
Study 2 recruits a representative sample of over 30,000 people across 
multiple countries who complete a broad sample of explicit and implicit 
measures. Researchers report descriptive and inferential statistics, and use 
both factor analyses and structural equation modeling. They pre-register 
their hypotheses and make their data publically available. 
Most psychologists would rate Study 2 as more important than Study 1 because its 
methods are more reliable, with higher power, more diverse participants, more varied items, 
more comprehensive analyses and more transparency. But I would argue that Study 1 is rather 
important: it was conducted by Solomon Asch (1963) and revealed that people will give the 
wrong answer to a very obvious question—which line is longest?—in order to conform. Despite 
having methodological features that many modern scientists would condemn, this study made 
an important and enduring contribution to psychological science. What of Study 2?  Its findings 
might be important, or trivial, or perhaps even misleading. The point is that you cannot judge 
science by its methods alone.  
Although good science must meet a threshold of reliability, its value hinges on its 
relevance to pressing social problems and to theory—the broader structure of science. Theory 
guides scientists when they select research questions, structure studies, specify hypotheses, 
choose analyses, and design interventions. Theory connects the dots to reveal the big picture; 
it allows us to build knowledge upward and outward. 
Of Bricks and Buildings  
Doing science involves building a structure of knowledge, but with uneven bricks. Each 
brick is a single study, with its size and shape set by the knowledge it reveals. As masons know, 
strong structures need strong bricks, and the same is true in science. Just as a few weak bricks 
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can bring down an entire wall, unreliable studies can threaten entire subfields. The importance 
of reliable methods in science is therefore indisputable, and recommends increased statistical 
power, improved transparency, and appropriate analyses.  
However, strong bricks are not enough for good buildings; instead, they must be 
combined precisely. As Henri Poincaré (1905) wrote, “Science is built up with facts, as a house 
is with stones. But a collection of facts is no more a science than a heap of stones is a house” (p. 
141).  Exhortations to increase reliability sometimes forget that individual studies matter only 
to the extent that they contribute to a unified structure of understanding, whether by inspiring 
new work, creating new connections, prompting re-interpretations of past work, and 
facilitating new interventions.  
The quest for reliable research methods—for making good bricks—is certainly noble, but 
the mere collection of reliable studies does not make for good science. We must remember 
that we scientists are not only brick-makers but also architects, and turn our attention back to 
building—to theory. 
The Benefits of Theory 
The role of theory in science is controversial, with some believing that there is often too 
much of it. Mischel (2008) suggests that theories in psychology are like toothbrushes: everyone 
wants their own, and no one wants to use others’. It’s true that psychologists delight in labeling 
effects and ideas, but so do all scientists: physicists name particles, chemists name reactions, 
and biologists name species. Crucially, naming phenomena as we name our children—so that 
they become ours—is not “theory” but are “Theories,” capitalized like all proper nouns, and 
pluralized to reflect their multitude. Theories need no championing, but lowercase, generic 
“theory” does. Theory specifies the interconnection of knowledge; it is the blueprints of the 
building, the guide for making new bricks, and the mortar that holds them together. 
A more classic metaphor for theory is a web, or nomological net (Cronbach & Meehl, 
1955), that outlines constructs and their operationalizations, and then explores their 
interconnections. Central to nomological nets are questions of validity: content validity (Does a 
measure actually assess the construct?), convergent validity (Is a construct associated with 
similar constructs?), and divergent validity (Is a construct distinct from dissimilar constructs?). 
Questions of theory are therefore ultimately questions of validity, as both focus on the 
interconnection between findings. The only difference between them is in popular usage, with 
“validity” referring to only a single claim, and “theory” referring to a set of claims—to the 
broader picture.  
Understanding theory as large-scale validity underscores its importance. By connecting 
scientific findings, it better defines them, reveals gaps in knowledge, and links disparate 
disciplines findings—just consider the integrative power of the theory of evolution.  One 
example in psychology are theories of social cognition, which link social judgment to cognitive 
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categorization (Fiske & Taylor, 2013).  These theories give psychology new understandings of 
stereotyping and prejudice, allowing for new interventions and countless new research 
avenues .  
The parallels between theory and validity provides the insight that reliability is necessary 
but not sufficient for theory. As hundreds of undergraduate textbooks assert, validity requires 
a threshold of reliability. Without a minimum association with itself (e.g., internal consistency), 
a measure cannot be associated with others. But even reliable measures can lack validity, and 
fail to accurately assesses what you believe it should. Simply making a brick does not 
guarantee that it fits well into the structure of science. 
The Tension between Methods and Theory 
Reliable methods (i.e., reliability) and rigorous theories (i.e., validity) are synergistic, as 
new methods can reveal new knowledge (Greenwald, 2012) that shape theory.  For example, 
theories of social cognition were transformed by measures of implicit attitudes (Greenwald, 
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005).  In his survey of the Nobel 
awards, Greenwald found two kinds of “method–theory synergy:” a) theories suggest new 
methods, and b) new methods generate previously inconceivable data, inspiring previously 
inconceivable theories.”  Despite this overarching synergy, one idea suggests a tension 
between them within the minds of individual researchers: the Theory of Action Identification.   
Action identification suggests that actions are inherently ambiguous and lead to multiple 
“identifications” (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). For example, shooting a gun could be merely 
moving your finger, or starting a revolution.  Identifications are called low-level if they focus on 
the close-up concrete details of the action—on the “how”—and are called high-level if they 
focus on the big-picture abstract reasons for the action—on the “why.” Research reveals that 
these two levels of identification often conflict (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987), with a focus on the 
“how” reducing an appreciation of the “why.”  For example, identifying getting married as 
“booking a photographer,” makes it less about “expressing your love.”  
Applying Action Identification to science suggests that more we focus upon sample sizes 
and data transparency (the how of science), the less we focus upon theory building (the why of 
science). A similar prediction is made from the Construal Level Theory (Trope & Liberman, 
2011), which suggests that the more you focus on the details within individual studies, the 
more you lose sight of the connections between these studies, missing the forest for the trees. 
In the language of Cronbach and Meehl, the more science focuses upon reliability—Do these 
effects persist?—the less it focuses upon validity—What exactly do these effects mean?   
The tension between “how” versus “why” may be hard to escape, but it needs to be 
managed, as both reliable methods and rigorous theory are essential to good science. We must 
embrace pluralism and respect scientists who focus primarily upon either developing reliable 
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methods or building rigorous theory.  Such scientific specialization is natural, as when 
physicists concentrate on either theory or experiments.  
Scientific pluralism also involves teaching graduate students about both methods and 
theory. There are already many courses about reliable methods (most programs have a 
“methods” course), but there is unfortunately is little explicit training in theory. This lack of 
theory-based instruction may stem from action identification, as it seems strange to specify 
the “how” when examining “why.”  Nevertheless, there is a concrete way to explore abstract 
ideas: theory mapping. 
Theory Mapping 
Theory mapping involves drawing out links between constructs, albeit in a specific way. 
Given that it focuses upon larger-scale associations rather than causal connections, theory 
maps are meant to complement the diagrams of mediation models and Structural Equation 
Modeling, not replace them. It is important to note that this technique is preliminary and it 
should be modified by researchers to fit their own purposes. It is also worth acknowledging 
that—as with any visual figure—comprehensiveness must be balanced with readability, and so 
researchers must choose which theoretical links are most important to map. Despite these 
caveats, theory mapping allows the concrete display of knowledge structures, which helps with 
theory evaluation (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2015) and encourages the features of “high 
quality science” (Finkel, Eastwick, & Reis, in press). It also allows new-comers to a field to see 
the most relevant constructs at a glance. 
I will illustrate theory mapping in two ways: with cars and with moral psychology.  Cars 
have nothing to do with psychology but intuitively illustrate theory mapping’s principles. A 
more technical application of the technique is provided by my work on dyadic morality, which 
suggests that we make moral judgments by comparing acts to a cognitive template of 
perceived harm (for a review, see Schein & Gray, 2017).  This harm is “dyadic,” involving an 
intentional agent (a perpetrator) causing damage to a vulnerable patient (a victim), often 
represented as “A→P.”   
Dyadic morality explains why acts like murder and assault are more immoral than tax 
evasion and double parking (they involve more perceived harm; Schein & Gray, 2015).  It also 
explains why cultures moralize values like purity and loyalty to the extent that they view their 
violation as harmful (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997).  For example, if you think gay 
marriage destroys both souls and society—like many conservative evangelicals—then you see 
it as immoral.  Conversely, if you think gay marriage harms no one—like many secular liberals—
then you see it as merely an act of love.  Importantly, the harm of dyadic morality is intuitive 
and perceived, not a reasoned matter of fact (Schein & Gray, 2015).  
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Element 1: Positive and negative associations, and empirical equivalence 
The simplest relationship in theory mapping is a positive or negative association between 
constructs, represented by a line connecting them (for positive correlations) or a line with a 
dash through it (for negative correlations). In Figure 1, we see the size of cars is positively 
related to safety in an accident, but negatively related to fuel efficiency; compared with 
compact cars, trucks fare better in crashes but burn more gas.   
In Figure 1, we also see that that recognizing the vulnerability of victim (i.e., patient) is 
tied to feelings of empathy. We empathize more with the vulnerable (e.g., children and 
animals) than with less vulnerable (e.g., adult humans; Preston & de Waal, 2001), and the more 
we empathize with someone, the more vulnerable they seem (Dijker, 2010). Figure 1 also 
illustrates that empathy is negatively linked to emotion regulation. As empathy can be an 
aversive experience (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981), emotion regulation 
prompts us to suppress this feeling (Cameron & Payne, 2011).  
 
Figure 1. Theory mapping displays associations between constructs 
 
 
In terms of validity, convergent validity is revealed by the presence of a line between 
relevant constructs (a significant correlation),1 whereas divergent validity is revealed by no line 
between non-relevant constructs (i.e., no significant correlation). For correlations of sufficient 
size (e.g., r > .8), one could argue that two constructs are empirically equivalent and therefore 
lack divergent validity—indicated by a line marked with ≈. For example, the immorality of 
popular “impurity” scenarios (e.g., having sex with a dead chicken; Graham, Nosek, & Haidt, 
2011) is predicted almost entirely by perceptions of harm (r = .87; Gray & Keeney, 2015), with 
the remaining variance accounted for by the weirdness of these bizarre scenarios. 
                                                 
1 In this case, there is a line when |r| > .3 
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Element 2: Moderation 
 Psychology has long emphasized the impact of moderating variables (e.g., individual 
differences) upon constructs. In theory mapping, moderators are in italics and enclosed within  
«  ». Figure 2 shows that differences in a car’s horsepower predict its price (more powerful cars 
are more expensive). 
Figure 2 also shows that psychopaths are less likely to feel empathy (Blair, 2005; Gray, 
Jenkins, Heberlein, & Wegner, 2011), and that those higher in autism are less likely to perceive 
intention (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).   
 
Figure 2. Theory mapping displays moderation 
 
 
Element 3: Fundamental elements 
Psychological experiences emerge from the combination of other, more fundamental 
elements (Lindquist, 2013). Just as you need the ingredients of butter, flour and sugar to make 
different kinds of cookies, so too do you need a set of psychological ingredients to make 
psychological phenomena. For example, proper facial recognition needs the more basic 
processes of vision and memory (Calder & Young, 2005; Young, Hugenberg, Bernstein, & 
Sacco, 2012). In theory mapping, fundamental elements—those necessary to “construct” a 
phenomenon2—are enclosed within an upward-pointing {  symbol.  
As Figure 3 displays, cars are constructed from the fundamental elements of an engine, a 
chassis, and a body.  Figure 3 also outlines that the strength of moral judgment hinges upon 
the combination of norm violations, negative affect, and perceived harm. People morally 
condemn acts that break norms and make them feel negative (Nichols, 2004), but not all such 
acts are immoral (Turiel, Hildebrandt, Wainryb, & Saltzstein, 1991). For example, spitting in 
your soup at a restaurant is both gauche and gross, but doesn’t warrant the same 
condemnation as spitting in someone else’s soup. The difference between these acts is 
                                                 
2 The idea that psychological phenomena emerge from a combination of more fundamental elements is a key tenet 
of constructionist theories (Barrett, 2013). 
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perceived harm, as it seems like you could get sick from someone else’s spit. Consistent with 
this idea, perceptions of harm reliably predict the wrongness acts, even those that seem 
objectively “harmless” (Schein & Gray, 2015; Schein, Ritter, & Gray, 2016). 
 
Figure 3. Theory mapping displays how phenomena are constructed from the combination of 
more fundamental elements 
 
 
Harm itself is also made from more fundamental elements: an intentional agent, a 
vulnerable patient, and the causation of damage (A→P; Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012). This 
explains why a CEO kicking a little girl seems more harmful—and therefore more immoral—
than a little girl throwing mud at a CEO: CEOs are seen as possessing more intention and less 
vulnerability than little girls (Wegner & Gray, 2016), and kicking causes more damage than 
throwing mud. 
The “{” symbol allows theory mapping to span different levels of analysis. Neural 
processes can combine to make cognitive processes, which can combine to make social 
processes, which can combine to make small-group processes, which can combine to make 
cultural processes. 
Element 4: Varieties or Examples 
Although psychological constructs are often discussed as single things, they clearly vary 
across time, person and culture. In theory mapping, different varieties or examples are 
illustrated with a dotted line to grey text.  In Figure 4, we can see the variety across car brands, 
as grouped by manufacturer nationality.   
Variation in phenomena is facilitated by variation in the fundamental elements 
underlying a phenomenon. For example, different varieties of love emerge from different 
amounts of the underlying elements of intimacy, commitment and passion (Sternberg, 1986). 
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With baked goods, different varieties stem from different combinations of ingredients such as 
flour, butter and eggs.  With cars, different models are allowed by different engines and 
bodies. 
Dyadic morality acknowledges variation in morality—moral pluralism (Shweder, 2012)—
and suggests that it arises from different varieties of norms (i.e., values; Schwartz, 1999) 
combined with different varieties of perceived harm (Gray et al., 2012). These varieties of harm 
are provided by underlying flexibility in who or what is seen as perpetrators (agents), victims 
(patients), and causes of harm.  For instance, when cultures moralize funeral practices, they do 
so because they see the immortal soul as vulnerable to harm (Shweder, 2012).   
 
Figure 4. Theory mapping displays how variability of a construct is provided by varieties of its 
fundamental elements 
 
Figure 4 illustrates varieties of agents, patients, and kinds of causation. For example, 
people can see adults, corporations and spirits as capable of perpetrating harm; can see 
damage caused via physical assault, emotional abuse, vandalism, or sacrilege; and can see 
vulnerable patients in the social order, eternal souls, children, and the future self. Of course, 
not all varieties are equally salient/typical, and so the most salient/typical variety (or two) is 
underlined. Typically, when we think of “immorality” we imagine an adult human as the 
intentional agent, someone vulnerable as the patient (e.g., a child), and the damage as 
physical. Together, these typical elemental varieties yield canonical varieties of immoral 
harm—child abuse or murder.  
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Theory mappers may sometimes wonder whether a construct is a “fundamental element” 
or a “variety or example.”  Fundamental elements are the necessary sub-processes or sub-
components needed give rise to a phenomenon, whereas varieties of elements represent 
taxonomic or content diversity, as revealed by techniques such as factor analyses, cluster 
analyses, and anthropological descriptions.  
Element 5: Numbers and Notes 
 Numbers and notes help supplement details lost when transforming multi-dimensional 
knowledge to two-dimensional space. For example, there is a “1” next to “Children” in Figure 4, 
which references the idea that people always highlight children in moral rhetoric (“Think of the 
children!”; Bryant, 1977; Schein, Goranson, & Gray, 2015). Notes can also specify 
operationalizations and provide justification for a potentially controversial connection. 
The Theory Map: Putting it all together 
 These five elements can all be combined to yield an overall Theory Map. Although 
seemingly complex, theory maps are built only out of the simple elements reviewed above, 
which seek to maximizes the information to “ink” ratio (Tufte, 1983). Theory maps can capture 
information about an entire program of research without pages of text, providing 
comprehensiveness, concreteness and conciseness. 
  
Figure 5. Theory map of cars, for illustrative purposes 
 
Cars.  A Theory Map for cars is displayed in Figure 5, revealing a) the construction of 
cars from chassis, engine, and body; b) the construction of the engine from crank shaft, 
cylinder block, and spark plugs; c) varieties (brands) of cars; d) moderators and their link to 
features such as price and fuel efficiency; e) varieties in engine and body type.  
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Moral judgment. A Theory Map for moral judgment is displayed in Figure 6, revealing 
a) the construction of (im)morality from norms, affect, and perceived harm; b) the construction 
of harm from the dyadic elements of agent, causation and patient; c) the varieties of affect 
(anger/disgust) and norms (authority/purity); d) the varieties of agents (adults/corporations), 
causation (abuse/vandalism) and patients (souls/social order); e) related processes 
(empathy/emotion regulation); and f) related moderating individual differences 
(RWA/autism/psychopathy).  
 
Figure 6. Theory map of moral judgment, as suggested by dyadic morality  
 
 
More Theory Maps. To further illustrate theory mapping, several scholars graciously 
provided theory maps for their fields of expertise.  Table 1 lists their names and topics, as well 
as a relevant publication for future reading.  These maps—and all maps explored so far—are 
provided in supplementary materials.  
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All these theory maps are listed on www.theorymaps.org. This website is meant to be a 
resource for the field, containing information about the technique, map templates, and many 
maps. I will post any theory maps sent to me (after a brief informal review) so that they are 
available to all. Importantly, theory maps can be submitted by anyone—whether a famous 
researcher, a well-read undergraduate, or a an entire graduate methods class working 
together.  Maps can be submitted for any topic, including one that already has a map, as 
science thrives through a plurality of perspectives. 
 
Table 1. Theory Maps of psychological phenomena 
Topic Map Authors Relevant Publication 
Word of Mouth Berger Berger (2014) 
Empathy 
Cameron, Scheffer, Spring 
& Hadjiandreou 
Cameron, Hutcherson, Ferguson, 
Scheffer & Inzlicht (2016) 
Motivation Etkin Etkin & Ratner (2012) 
Cultural Tightness Gelfand & Jackson Gelfand et al., (2011) 
Revenge Gollwitzer & Stouten Gollwitzer (2009) 
Facial Expressions Jack Jack & Schyns (2016) 
Emotion Lindquist Lindquist (2013) 
Social Power Magee, Galinsky & Rucker Galinsky, Rucker & Magee (2015) 
Endowment Effect Morewedge Morewedge & Giblin (2015) 
Stress Muscatell Muscatell & Eisenberger (2012) 
Priming Payne Loersch & Payne (2011) 
Health Behavior Sheeran & Rothman Sheeran, Klein, & Rothman (2017) 
Ideology Stern & Ondish Jost (2006) 
Emotion Regulation Tamir & Vishkin Vishkin & Tamir (2017) 
Mind Perception Waytz & Gray Waytz, Gray, Epley & Wegner (2010) 
 
Benefits of Theory Mapping 
 Although individual pet Theories can entrench viewpoints and bias perceptions, 
mapping out theory helps transcend these limitations by providing specificity and synthesis. 
Specificity 
By formalizing associations between constructs, mapping brings specificity to theory, 
which is all too often left vague (Greenwald, Pratkanis, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1986). This 
specificity may help resolve arguments by revealing that debates focus upon different levels of 
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analysis, or upon different associations. Of course, by revealing the larger context of debates, 
theory mapping can also reveal that superficial skirmishes are actually deep disagreements 
about the human mind—such with different interpretations of emotion (Lindquist, Siegel, 
Quigley, & Barrett, 2013) and morality (Cameron, Lindquist, & Gray, 2015). 
The specificity of theory mapping may help to prevent redundancies. How many times 
has an old construct been “discovered” under a new name because investigators failed to 
specify the broader set of connected phenomena?  Theory mapping may also increase validity 
and reliability because the convergence and divergence of constructs can be evaluated with a 
glance, and because connections between concepts can be concretely specified in advance.  
Synthesis 
Theory mapping helps evaluate both the coherence of grand ideas and the contribution 
of specific studies. By detailing the constructs involved in research project, readers can easily 
see the theoretical consistency and scope of a paper. Authors get upset when editors reject 
papers for “insufficient theory,” and extensions of theory mapping could provide a way to 
quantify what has always been qualitative, whether through the sheer number of connections 
implied by a paper, or through more complex network metrics (Rafols & Meyer, 2009).  
By looking at the surrounding context, theory mapping also helps evaluate the likelihood 
of new findings. A phenomenon that is consistent with other nearby phenomena is more likely 
to replicate than one that contradicts them all. In other words, theory mapping helps establish 
Bayesian priors regarding the truth of an effect.  
Theory can also move subfields past debates about whether a phenomenon is “true” vs. 
“false.”  Consider discussions about social priming—whether being subtly primed with words 
like “Florida” and “grey” makes people walk more slowly. Work in cognitive psychology reveals 
that concepts activate similar concepts (Collins & Loftus, 1975), and that cognition is embodied 
(Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005), but also that such primes do 
not automatically translate into behavior (Loersch & Payne, 2011). The interconnection of 
these findings provide a nuanced perspective upon social priming that goes beyond 
dichotomies, and suggests that we need not discard a phenomenon even if its most 
counterintuitive demonstrations are controversial (for similar thoughts, see Dijksterhuis, 2014). 
Conclusion 
Good science requires reliable methods and rigorous theory, but there is little discussion 
about how to improve the rigor of theory. Theory mapping provides one way for connecting 
ideas, building knowledge structures, and for making concrete what once was vague. This 
technique may prove helpful in journals, classrooms, and anywhere else we need to evaluate 
ideas and synthesize studies. In the quest to improve science, the psychology has 
understandably focused upon reliability, but even if every study is perfect, we still need to build 
them into a grand structure of knowledge—and for that, some blueprints would be handy.  
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